Working with Law Enforcement
Law enforcement involvement during a cyber incident is a decision with real operational consequences — both for engaging and for not engaging. Understanding what LE can and cannot do changes when and how you make that call.
You are on day two of a confirmed intrusion. The attacker has been in the environment for at least three weeks based on the earliest evidence. They've accessed financial systems and what appears to be M&A data. Your CISO wants to know: should we call the FBI? The business wants to remediate immediately and not involve outside parties who might slow things down. Legal is worried about disclosure implications. Your threat intel team suspects this may be a nation-state actor based on TTPs. All four of those perspectives are valid and conflicting. This chapter explains how to make an informed decision about law enforcement engagement.
Which Law Enforcement Agency Does What
Federal law enforcement in the United States has multiple agencies with cybercrime jurisdiction. Knowing who to contact — and why — matters for the quality of response you receive and the type of investigative support available.
US Federal Cybercrime Law Enforcement
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FBI Cyber Division
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Jurisdiction: Computer intrusion, cybercrime, ransomware, IP theft,
nation-state operations in the US private sector
When to call: Ransomware (especially if paying), nation-state
attribution suspected, theft of trade secrets,
financial fraud, critical infrastructure attacks
What they provide:
• Threat actor attribution and intelligence sharing
• Assistance identifying if your ransomware group is sanctioned (OFAC)
• Connection to FBI Cyber Action Team for on-site assistance
• Intelligence about the threat actor that you won't find elsewhere
• Victim notification: FBI often knows about victims before victims know
Local contacts: Each FBI field office has a Cyber Task Force
Find yours at FBI.gov → Contact Us → Field Offices
CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency)
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Not law enforcement: CISA is a defensive agency — it provides
technical assistance, not criminal investigation
When to call: Critical infrastructure, government systems, large-scale
incidents with sector-wide implications, ransomware
What they provide:
• Free technical IR assistance (CISA has a cyber response team)
• Threat intelligence sharing via ISACs
• CIRCIA reporting (required for some critical infrastructure)
Contact: report@cisa.gov or 1-888-282-0870
Secret Service (Electronic Crimes Task Force)
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Jurisdiction: Financial crimes: payment card fraud, ACH fraud,
BEC, financial system attacks
When to call: Business Email Compromise, financial fraud, attacks
on financial institutions
Contact: Local ECTF office
DOJ Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS)
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Jurisdiction: Federal prosecution of computer crimes — the prosecutors
who will eventually charge the people FBI arrests
When to call: Typically engaged via FBI; direct contact rare for victims
What Law Enforcement Can Actually Do for You
Organizations often have unrealistic expectations about law enforcement — either thinking LE will immediately catch the attacker (rare), or thinking LE provides no value (wrong). Understanding the realistic value proposition helps you make a clear-eyed engagement decision.
| What LE can do | What LE cannot do |
|---|---|
| Share threat intelligence about the specific actor, including TTPs and victim history that you cannot access through commercial threat intel | Stop the incident faster than your own containment actions |
| Tell you whether a ransomware group is on the OFAC sanctions list (critical before paying) | Guarantee any prosecution — most cybercriminals operate from jurisdictions with no extradition treaty |
| Issue legal process (subpoenas) to cloud providers, ISPs, and payment processors that you cannot reach privately — potentially tracing attacker infrastructure | Provide real-time operational support in most cases (FBI field agents are not SOC analysts) |
| Notify you if they have intelligence about your organization being targeted before you discover a breach | Guarantee your investigation remains confidential — LE investigations can become public through court filings, indictments, and press releases |
| Provide victim services, including connection to CISA technical assistance and referrals to specialized IR firms | Prevent civil litigation from other parties who learn about the breach |
| Seize and disrupt attacker infrastructure in some cases (rare but has happened) | Recover your data if it was exfiltrated |
One underappreciated FBI function: victim notification. The FBI often identifies victim organizations through their investigation of threat actors — they may discover your organization was breached by analyzing seized attacker infrastructure, observing traffic patterns, or receiving information from foreign partners — before you've detected the breach yourself. The FBI has processes for notifying victim organizations when they obtain information that organization has been compromised. This is why organizations that have existing relationships with their local FBI field office Cyber Task Force receive this notification; organizations with no FBI contact may not. Establishing a relationship before an incident — visiting your field office, participating in InfraGard — is worth doing proactively.
The Law Enforcement Engagement Decision
Whether to involve law enforcement is a business and legal decision, not purely a technical one. The decision framework involves weighing specific factors for your organization's situation.
LE Engagement Decision Framework
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Factors FAVORING LE engagement:
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✓ Nation-state or APT attribution suspected
(LE has intelligence you don't; government support is valuable)
✓ Ransomware: need OFAC check before paying
(paying a sanctioned group can be a federal crime)
✓ Ransomware: FBI may have the decryption key
(has happened with LockBit, Hive, others via takedowns)
✓ Financial fraud: BEC, wire fraud, payment card theft
(Secret Service/FBI can pursue financial trails)
✓ Trade secret theft: IP theft prosecutable under Economic Espionage Act
✓ Critical infrastructure: CISA reporting may be required
✓ Large-scale impact: 100k+ victims, systemic attack
Factors AGAINST or complicating LE engagement:
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✗ Fear of press release / public disclosure
(LE investigations can become public; discuss with counsel)
✗ Active remediation timeline conflict
(LE may ask you not to touch systems during evidence preservation)
✗ Information sharing concerns
(details shared with LE may appear in court documents)
✗ Attacker country has no extradition treaty
(prosecution may be impossible — but intelligence still valuable)
✗ Legal privilege concerns
(communications with outside counsel are privileged;
communications shared with LE may not be)
The call:
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Legal counsel should make the final engagement decision.
IR team provides: forensic facts, attacker attribution assessment,
timeline of events. Legal decides: how much to share and when.
Evidence Preservation Before LE Contact
If you decide to involve law enforcement, the sequence matters. Do not contact law enforcement before taking steps to preserve evidence. Law enforcement investigators will request evidence that was collected using forensically sound methods. Evidence preserved after LE contact, in a rush, under LE direction, is less reliable than evidence collected proactively with proper methodology.
| Before LE contact — preserve | Method | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Volatile memory from key systems | WinPmem, AVML (Linux), or EDR memory acquisition | Memory contains running processes, network connections, decryption keys, malware that never touches disk — gone when host reboots |
| Disk images of compromised hosts | FTK Imager, dc3dd — sector-by-sector forensic image with hash verification | Provides the complete record that LE investigators will examine; required for admissible evidence |
| Log exports: Windows Event Logs, Sysmon, firewall, proxy, VPN, authentication | Export and hash immediately — logs rotate and may be overwritten | Log retention policies may delete critical evidence within days |
| Email headers and full email data for BEC or phishing-related incidents | Export as .eml or .msg with headers preserved; do not forward | Forwarded emails lose original headers that establish sender origin |
| Malware samples | Preserve in password-protected zip or forensic container; compute hash | LE will submit to FBI malware lab — needs pristine copy |
| Network captures (PCAP) | If available from network taps, firewalls, or SPAN ports — export the relevant time window | May show C2 communication, data exfiltration volume, or attacker commands |
The pressure during an incident is to fix it — reimaging systems, blocking IPs, deleting malware, restoring from backups. Every one of those remediation actions destroys evidence. There is a real tension between the IR timeline (remediate as fast as possible to stop damage) and the legal/law enforcement timeline (preserve everything). The practical resolution: collect forensic images from all affected hosts before beginning any remediation. This adds a few hours but enables both objectives — you have pristine evidence for LE and you can then remediate freely. If the organization has made the decision to involve law enforcement before remediation begins, that decision should also include carving out 4–8 hours for evidence collection before the wipe-and-reimage cycle starts. If remediation has already begun when LE involvement is decided, immediately stop further remediation until LE has been briefed and agreed on an evidence preservation plan.
Working With FBI Agents During the Investigation
The FBI will assign a special agent (SA) and often a computer scientist to work your case. The relationship works best when you understand what they need, what they will and won't share, and where the interests diverge.
LE Relationship Mechanics
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What LE will ask for:
• All forensic evidence: disk images, memory images, log exports
• Chain of custody documentation for all evidence
• Your timeline of events and network topology
• Any information about the attacker's communications
(ransom notes, threat actor chat logs if available)
• The ability to interview key personnel
What LE will share (limited):
• Operational intelligence sharing is limited by:
- Active investigation restrictions (can't share investigation details)
- Classification (attribution intel may be classified)
- Rule of law (they cannot share info that would compromise prosecution)
• They can tell you: "Yes, this is [known group]"
• They often cannot tell you: specific indicators from other victims
• Long-term: intelligence shared through InfraGard or sector ISACs
The investigation timeline tension:
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Your timeline: contain in hours, eradicate in days, recover in weeks
LE timeline: investigation may take months to years before prosecution
Resolution: agree on which systems you can remediate and when.
LE will typically identify the most critical evidence to preserve
and allow you to remediate the rest. Get this agreement in writing.
Do not assume LE authorization — get explicit confirmation before
reimaging systems they may need.
Confidentiality:
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You can request that LE keep the victim's identity confidential in
public statements, court filings, and press releases. They will try
to honor this but cannot guarantee it. Indictments that name victim
organizations are public. Discuss with LE early if confidentiality
is important to you.
Q & A
Q: The FBI contacts you to say they believe your organization may have been compromised based on data from a threat actor investigation. You have not detected a breach. What do you do?
Take it seriously and investigate immediately: (1) Ask the FBI contact for as much specificity as they can share — timeframe, the type of indicator they have (network traffic, malware sample, attacker infrastructure), and whether this is a confirmed intrusion or a suspected one. The more specific information you can get, the more targeted your investigation. (2) Launch an internal investigation immediately, focused on the timeframe and indicator type the FBI provided. If they saw network traffic, review your firewall/proxy logs for that period. If they found your data on an attacker's seized server, work to identify what data it was and what systems might have been the source. (3) Engage outside IR counsel and an external IR firm — this is not a situation to work entirely internally. The FBI contact itself creates disclosure implications that require legal review. (4) Brief legal and the CISO within hours. This may trigger notification obligations depending on what the investigation finds. (5) Preserve evidence before investigating aggressively — the impulse is to dig in, but accessing affected systems without forensic methodology may destroy the evidence you need. Collect forensic images first, then investigate from copies. (6) Establish a liaison with the FBI agent — you will need an ongoing point of contact. The agent has information you need and needs information from you. Get a direct line of communication established at the outset.
Q: Law enforcement asks you to leave an attacker's backdoor in place so they can monitor the attacker for 30 more days. Do you agree?
This is a serious request that requires CEO/CISO and legal review — it cannot be agreed to at the IR team level: (1) The legal question: operating a compromised system with a known active backdoor creates liability. If any data is accessed during the 30-day window, you have a notification obligation that starts from the day you confirmed the breach, not from when you eventually remediate it. You may be knowingly exposing your customers' data to an attacker. (2) The security question: monitoring an attacker's access through their own backdoor is technically complex. If they escalate activity or access sensitive systems during the monitoring window, you may be unable to contain quickly. (3) The realistic LE question: what specific investigative value do the next 30 days provide? LE should be able to articulate clearly why this monitoring period will lead to prosecution, attribution, or intelligence value that cannot be obtained otherwise. "We want to see if they come back" is not enough justification for 30 days of continued exposure. (4) If you agree: get the agreement in writing, specifying exactly what monitoring will occur, what actions LE will take if the attacker escalates, and a hard stop date. Engage legal to document the decision and the reasoning, which protects the organization from liability claims arising from the extended exposure window.
Q: You've identified the ransomware group as LockBit. Before paying the ransom, what specifically should you ask the FBI?
Three critical questions: (1) OFAC sanctions check: "Is LockBit currently on the OFAC SDN list?" This is the first question before any ransom payment. As of early 2024, LockBit leadership (Dmitry Khoroshev) was sanctioned by multiple governments. Paying a sanctioned entity, even for ransomware recovery, may be a federal crime and can result in civil monetary penalties. The FBI can confirm current sanction status. (2) Decryptor availability: "Do you have a decryptor for LockBit from any recent takedown?" In February 2024, Operation Cronos disrupted LockBit and the FBI obtained decryption keys for some victims. The FBI maintains a list of known decryption keys and will share them with victims where applicable. This could make ransom payment unnecessary entirely. (3) Active investigation: "If we pay this ransom, will it interfere with any ongoing investigation?" FBI investigators may ask you to preserve specific communications with the ransomware group for investigative purposes. Coordinate before taking any action that could disrupt their investigation while also not delaying your recovery unnecessarily.
Q: You involve the FBI and the investigation takes 18 months. During that time, a plaintiff attorney serving discovery asks for all IR-related communications, including your FBI case file. What is your obligation?
This requires outside counsel to navigate — the specifics depend on the type of proceeding and the scope of the discovery request, but the key considerations: (1) Attorney-client privilege: communications between your legal team and you about the incident are privileged and generally not discoverable. Purely operational IR communications (timeline, technical findings, email threads) generally are not privileged. (2) Work product doctrine: documents prepared in anticipation of litigation (often documents prepared after a known breach when litigation is reasonably foreseeable) may be protected under work product doctrine. Your outside counsel should have been structuring the investigation from early on to maximize work product protection. (3) FBI/law enforcement materials: law enforcement investigative files are generally not accessible to private plaintiffs through civil discovery directed at you — the files belong to the government. However, the existence of the FBI investigation and materials you provided to the FBI are generally not protected by privilege. (4) What this means in practice: your IR timeline, forensic reports, notification decisions, and communications about the incident are likely discoverable in civil litigation. The FBI investigation itself is separate. This is another reason why every IR document should be written as if it will be projected on a screen in a courtroom.