Chapter 67

Windows Services

SCM architecture, service types and start modes, svchost ServiceDll hosting, service creation telemetry, and malicious service persistence detection.

Scenario

Incident response on a compromised server. The team finds a service named "WindowsFontDriverHost2" with description "Manages fonts for the desktop window manager." Binary path: C:\ProgramData\FontHelper\fonthost.exe. Start type: Automatic. Current state: Running. It was created 4 days ago at 2:37 AM — perfectly mimicking a legitimate Windows service name. Running it as SYSTEM. This is malware persistence via Windows Service — a classic technique because services auto-start, run as SYSTEM, and persist reboots.

SCM Architecture


  Service Control Manager Architecture
  ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

  Boot / System startup
       │
       ▼
  ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  │  SCM (services.exe)                                       │
  │  The central service controller — runs at boot, SYSTEM   │
  │                                                           │
  │  Reads service database from registry:                    │
  │  HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\     │
  │                                                           │
  │  For each AutoStart service:                              │
  │  ├── Type 0x10 (Win32OwnProcess): spawns own exe          │
  │  ├── Type 0x20 (Win32ShareProcess): loads into svchost    │
  │  └── Type 0x01 (KernelDriver): loads driver               │
  └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
             │
             ├──► spawns svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p (for Type 0x20)
             │         svchost loads ServiceDll from registry
             │
             └──► spawns .exe (for Type 0x10)

    

Service Registry Structure

Every service has a key under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\:

Registry ValueDescriptionAttacker target
ImagePathExecutable path (Type 0x10) or "svchost.exe -k groupname" (Type 0x20)Change to malware binary path
Start0=Boot, 1=System, 2=Automatic, 3=Manual, 4=DisabledSet to 2 (AutoStart) for persistence
Type0x10=OwnProcess, 0x20=ShareProcess, 0x01=KernelDriverUsually 0x10 for malicious services
ObjectNameAccount to run as (LocalSystem, LocalService, NetworkService, or domain account)LocalSystem for max privileges
DescriptionHuman-readable description (shown in services.msc)Set to mimic legitimate service
Parameters\ServiceDllFor Type 0x20: actual DLL loaded by svchostReplace DLL path for stealthy injection into svchost

Svchost and ServiceDll Hosting

Many Windows services run inside shared svchost.exe processes (Type 0x20). The actual code is in a DLL specified by Parameters\ServiceDll. This is a stealthy persistence target:

Registry
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\wuauserv
    Type = 0x20 (ShareProcess, runs in svchost)
    ImagePath = %SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p
    Start = 2 (Automatic)
    Parameters\
        ServiceDll = %SystemRoot%\System32\wuaueng.dll  ← attacker changes this

# Attacker replaces legitimate DLL path:
HKLM\...\Parameters\ServiceDll = C:\ProgramData\evil.dll
# Now svchost.exe loads evil.dll — malware runs inside trusted svchost.exe
Common mistake

Defenders often alert on services where ImagePath points to an unusual location. But ServiceDll hijacking points ImagePath at the legitimate svchost.exe — nothing unusual there. The malicious path is buried in Parameters\ServiceDll. Always check ServiceDll for svchost-hosted services, not just ImagePath.

Service Creation Telemetry

Event IDChannelDescription
7045SystemNew service installed — ServiceName, ImagePath, StartType, AccountName
7036SystemService entered running/stopped state
7040SystemService start type changed (e.g., Disabled → Automatic)
4697SecurityA service was installed — mirrors 7045, requires audit policy
4688SecurityProcess creation — sc.exe command line shows service creation parameters

Sigma Rules

YAMLsuspicious_service_installed.yml
title: Suspicious Service Installed from Unusual Path
status: stable
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
    definition: 'Event ID 7045'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 7045
    filter_legit_paths:
        ImagePath|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    condition: selection and not filter_legit_paths
falsepositives:
    - Software installation to non-standard paths
    - Pentest tools (Metasploit creates a service)
level: high
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1543.003
YAMLservicedll_modified.yml
title: ServiceDll Registry Value Modified
status: experimental
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
    definition: 'Sysmon Event ID 13'
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Services\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Parameters\ServiceDll'
    filter_installer:
        Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter_installer
level: high

Q & A

Q: Event 7045 fires for a new service with ImagePath C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe. Is this always malicious?

Very likely malicious. Legitimate services don't use cmd.exe as their binary — cmd.exe is an interactive shell, not a service executable. A service binary must implement the Service Control Handler protocol (RegisterServiceCtrlHandler, SetServiceStatus) — cmd.exe doesn't do this, so the service would either fail to start or start and immediately exit. The attacker may be using sc.exe to register a one-shot execution rather than persistent service: sc create evil binPath= "cmd.exe /c ...". Event 7045 with cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or wscript.exe as ImagePath should always be investigated. Even if the service fails to start, the registry key remains — malware may use the "install service" API call purely to achieve code execution once.